Abstract. We consider general secure function evaluation (SFE) of private functions (PF-SFE). Recall, privacy of functions is often most efficiently achieved by general SFE [17, 18, 9 ] of a Universal Circuit (UC). Our main contribution is a new simple and efficient UC construction. Our circuit UC k , universal for circuits of k gates, has size ∼ 1.5k log 2 k and depth ∼ k log k. It is up to 50% smaller than the best UC (of Valiant [15] , of size ∼ 19k log k) for circuits of size up to ≈ 5000 gates. Our improvement results in corresponding performance improvement of SFE of (small) private functions. Since, due to cost, only small circuits (i.e. < 5000 gates) are practical for PF-SFE, our construction appears to be the best fit for many practical PF-SFE. We implement PF-SFE based on our UC and Fairplay SFE system [10] .
Introduction
We consider two-party secure function evaluation (SFE) of private functions (PF-SFE). Recall, "regular" SFE techniques allow two parties to evaluate any function on their respective inputs x and y, while keeping the inputs secret. SFE is a subject of immense amount of research, e.g. [17, 18, 9] . Efficient SFE algorithms enable a variety of electronic transactions, previously impossible due to mutual mistrust of participants. Examples include auctions [11, 3, 5, 1] , contract signing [4] , distributed database mining [7, 8] , etc. As computation and communication resources have increased, SFE became practical for common use. Fairplay [10] is a full implementation of generic two-party SFE with malicious players. It demonstrates feasibility and efficiency of SFE of practical functions, represented as circuits of up to ≈ 10 6 gates. Today, generic SFE is a relatively mature technology, and even small improvements are non-trivial and welcome.
In this work, we impose an additional restriction on SFE. Namely, we require that the evaluated function is known only by one party and needs to be kept secret (i.e. everything besides the size, the number of inputs and the number of
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outputs is hidden from the other party). Examples of real-life private functions include credit evaluation function, background-and medical history checking function, airport no-fly check function, etc. Full or even partial revelation of these functions opens vulnerabilities in the corresponding process, exploitable by dishonest participants (e.g. credit applicants), and should be prevented.
It is well known that the problem of PF-SFE can be reduced to the "regular" SFE [14, 13] . This is done by parties evaluating a Universal Circuit (UC) instead of a circuit defining the evaluated function. UC can be thought of as a "program execution circuit", capable of simulating any circuit C of certain size, given the description of C as input. Therefore, disclosing the UC does not reveal anything about C, except its size. At the same time, the SFE computes output correctly and C remains private, since the player holding C simply treats description of C as additional (private) input to SFE. This reduction is the most common (and often the most efficient) way of securely evaluating private functions [14, 13] .
Our improvement of the UC construction directly results in improvements of PF-SFE for many practical private functions of interest. Indeed, circuit-based SFE (e.g. Yao's garbled circuit [17, 18, 9] ) is still the most efficient SFE method for many important functions, such as the comparison function. The elegant and very efficient auction system of Naor, Pinkas and Sumner [11] implements auction function as a circuit, as well. Further, due to the size of UC constructions, PF-SFE is practical only for small circuits (UC for 5000-gate circuits has size 10 6 , pushing the general SFE size limit). Therefore, improvements of circuit representation is particularly relevant for small circuits, and this is the focus and the result of our work.
Our contributions
Our main contribution is a new elegant and efficient universal circuit UC k construction of size ∼ 1.5k log 2 k and depth ∼ k log k. For the circuits most relevant for PF-SFE (of size up to ≈ 5000), our approach results in up to 50% size reduction compared to asymptotically optimal construction of Valiant [15] . See Table 1 in Sect. 5 for detailed comparison. As described above, this immediately implies improvement in the practical PF-SFE. We expand this discussion and present additional applications below in Sect. 1.3.
Our constructions are simple and practical. We used them to implement PF-SFE as an extension of the Fairplay SFE system [10] .
The basic building blocks we developed (such as the efficient S u v selection blocks of Sect. 4.2) may be of use in other circuit constructions as well.
Related work
The most efficient known UC k construction is the celebrated construction of Valiant [15] . With size ∼ 19k log k, it is asymptotically optimal, with a small constant factor. It relies on universal graphs. UC k is derived from a universal graph UG k ; UC k is universal for circuits of size k, if UG k is universal for graphs of k nodes and in-and out-degrees 2. Embedding of the graph representation of a circuit C into UG k defines the programming of UC k to simulate C. As noted above, our construction produces smaller UC k for circuits most relevant for PF-SFE. Further, we believe that implementation of our construction is more self-contained and straightforward.
Waksman [16] describes how to construct and program a permutation network, a circuit implementing an arbitrary permutation on n elements. Waksman's construction is asymptotically optimal (size ∼ 2n log n and depth ∼ 2 log n). We use this work in an essential way -fundamental building blocks of our UC construction rely on [16] .
Applications for universal circuits
As discussed above, UC is naturally used to extend the functionality or privacy in numerous practical SFE applications, in particular those based on Yao's garbled circuit [17, 18, 9] . Recall, Yao's approach views the evaluated function as a binary circuit known to both parties. The idea is to encrypt the signals on all wires of the circuit. Then the evaluator (one of the participants of the computation) uses clever setup and properties of encryption to compute (gate by gate) encryption of the output wires from the encryptions of input wires. The result of SFE is obtained by decrypting the values of the output wires of the circuit. We note that the cost of Yao's construction depends only on the size of the circuit, and not on its depth or fan-out. To perform PF-SFE, instead of evaluating the circuit directly, a UC that is programmed with the original circuit is evaluated. As UC can be programmed with any circuit, the evaluated function is entirely hidden from the evaluator.
We discuss natural applications that directly benefit from our improvements. Frikken et. al [6] show a privacy-preserving credit checking scheme that is based on the evaluation of a garbled circuit. Their scheme is limited to the special class of credit-checking policies that can be expressed as the weighted sum of criteria. By evaluating a universal circuit their scheme can be extended to arbitrary, more complicated, private credit-checking policies.
Cachin et al. [2] describe autonomous mobile agents which migrate between several distrusting hosts. Garbled-circuit-based, their scheme ensures the privacy of the inputs of the visited hosts but not the structure of the mobile agent's code. The privacy of the executed code can be guaranteed by evaluating universal circuits instead.
Ostrovsky and Skeith [12] show how to filter remote streaming data (e.g airports' passenger lists, on-line news feeds or internet chat-rooms) using secret keywords and their combinations, such as no-fly lists. Their protocol allows Collector (e.g. airport) to obliviously filter out entries that match the (encrypted) query, which are then sent back for decryption. Their scheme can be naturally extended to allow a much finer private matching criteria, additionally preserving data privacy, as follows. The Collector encrypts each filtered stream element with a random pad. The querying party thus obtains the list of encrypted matches. In the second round, the querying party uses PF-SFE (e.g. using our UC k ) to search the matching data with an arbitrary, more detailed private search function.
Definitions and Preliminaries
In this section, we present basic notation and building blocks of our construction.
In the following, a gate is the implementation of a boolean function {0, 1} 2 → {0, 1} that has two inputs and one output. We consider acyclic circuits that consist of connected gates with arbitrary fanout, i.e. the (single) output of each gate can be used as input to an arbitrary number of gates. Further, each output of the circuit C is the output of a gate and not a redirected input of C.
A (B) , is the number of gates B consists of; its depth, depth(B), is the maximum number of gates between any input and any output of B. A block can be a sub-block of a larger block. We construct a circuit as a collection of functional blocks, as this simplifies presentation.
A programmable block is a block that consists of connected programmable gates with unspecified function tables. Programming a programmable block is done by providing a specific function table for each of its gates.
A Universal Circuit UC u,v,k is a programmable block with u inputs and v outputs that can be programmed to simulate any circuit C with up to u inputs, v outputs and k gates. UC C denotes UC that is programmed to simulate circuit
A one-output switching block Y is a programmable block that computes (in 1 , in 2 ) → in 1 or in 2 , as shown in Fig. 1 A two-output switching block X is a programmable block shown on Fig. 1 
. It is implemented by using (in parallel) two Y blocks: one for each of the outputs. size(X) = 2; depth(X) = 1. 
Our universal circuit construction
In this section, we present our modular UC construction. All of the necessary building blocks were introduced in Sect. 2; here we show how to assemble them. Then, in Sect. 4, we design improved versions of some building blocks, which results in performance improvement of our UC.
In our UC construction, we simulate each gate
. In our construction, we always ensure that inputs, outputs and semantics of G Sim i correspond to G i . Additionally, we hide the wiring of C by ensuring that every possible wiring can be implemented in UC u,v,k . This is the natural method of construction of UC, and is, in fact, employed by Valiant [15] .
We design our UC construction recursively (we build a circuit from two circuits of smaller size). We first note that the input/output interface of UC u,v,k is different from that of the natural recursion step. This is why we introduce a universal block U k . U k can be viewed as a UC with specific input and output semantics. Namely, U k has 2k inputs and k outputs, since this is a maximum UC u,v,k can have. Further, we restrict that U k 's inputs in 2i−1 , in 2i are only delivered to the simulation gate G . (Of course, input of some gates G i may come from any other gates' outputs, and not from in 2i−1 or in 2i , which may not be used at all. U k allows this; it only restricts that G i 's input cannot come from other in j ). U k is thus a UC for the class of circuits of size k with the above input/output restrictions. Now, given an implementation of U k , it is easy to construct UC u,v,k (shown on Fig. 2) . We need to provide the input selection block, which directs inputs of UC to the proper inputs of U k . Finally, we need the output selection block, directing outputs of U k to the proper outputs of UC, and discarding unused outputs. Both blocks are instances of selection blocks discussed above.
In the next section, we present our U k construction. Plugged in the construction of Fig. 2 , it gives a complete UC construction.
Recursive universal block construction
In this section, we describe the natural divide-and-conquer procedure for constructing U k , capable of simulating any circuit C k of size k, with the input/output restrictions mentioned above.
In the following, we refer to the gates of the circuit C k by their index. We choose a topological order of the gates G 1 , . . . , G k , which ensures that the i-th gate G i has no inputs that are outputs of a successive gate G j , where j > i. Since we only consider acyclic circuits, we can always obtain this ordering by topological sorting with complexity O(k). Now, suppose we have two blocks U k/2 , universal for circuits C k/2 of size k/2. We would like to combine them to obtain U k . Clearly, because of their universality, one of U k/2 could simulate the "upper" half of C k (i.e. gates G 1 through G k/2 ) , and the other U k/2 could simulate the lower half (gates G k/2+1 , . . . , G k ). Note, by the topological ordering, there is no data going into the upper U k/2 from the lower one. Thus, U k must only direct its inputs/outputs and allow implementation of all possible data paths from the upper U k/2 to the lower one. This can be naturally done, as shown on Fig. 3(a) . We describe this in detail below. The first k inputs to U k in 1 , .., in k are directly sent to the upper U k/2 . Note, the order of the inputs matches the interface perfectly, so no additional manipulation is required. The k/2 outputs of the upper (resp. lower) U k/2 are sent directly to the first (resp. second) half of the outputs of U k . Again, interfaces match, and no manipulation is required.
We now only need to show how the inputs to the lower U k/2 are provided. These inputs could come from (any G Sim i gate of) the upper U k/2 . Therefore, we also wire the outputs of upper U k/2 into a selection block S k/2 k . This allows to direct, with duplicates, the output of any gate of upper U k/2 to any position of the input interface of lower U k/2 (and thus to any gate of lower U k/2 ). Additionally, (some of) lower U k/2 's inputs could come from the U k inputs in k+1 , ...in 2k . Since the lower U k/2 simulates gates G k/2+1 through G k of C k , inputs in k+1 , ...in 2k are already ordered to match lower U k/2 's interface. Now, for each input of lower U k/2 , we need to switch between the two input wires: one provided by upper U k/2 via S k/2 k , and the other coming from U k 's input directly. This is easily achieved by a Y switching block. On the diagram, for ease of presentation, we combine the k of these Y blocks into a mixing block M k , shown on Fig. 3(b) with
The base case of the recursive construction is U 1 , a universal block implementing a single gate. U 1 is implemented by a single programmable gate. This completes the description of the recursive U k construction.
The above immediately implies efficient methods of UC programming, given the circuit C k . In particular, if the first (resp. second) input of a gate G j in the lower half of C k (k/2 < j ≤ k) is connected to an input of C k , the mixing block M k is programmed to select the corresponding input in 2j−1 (resp. in 2j ) of U k by programming Y 2j−k−1 (resp. Y 2j−k ) of M k correspondingly (see Fig. 3(b) ). Otherwise, if G j is connected to an output of a gate G i in the upper half of C k (1 ≤ i ≤ k/2), M k and S k/2 k are programmed to select the corresponding output from the upper U k/2 block by programming Y 2j−k−1 (resp. Y 2j−k ) correspondingly and programming S k/2 k with σ 2j−k−1 = i (resp. σ 2j−k = i).
We now compute the complexity of our constructions U k and UC (using selection block constructions of Sect. 4.2). Recall, the cost of Yao's garbled circuit depends only on its size, and not on depth. Note, size(U 1 ) = 1, depth(U 1 ) = 1.
Using the optimization of Sect. 4.3, U k has complexity size(U k ) = 1.5k log 2 k− 1.5k log k + 6k − 5 and depth(U k ) = k log k + 4 log k − 11.
U k combined with input-and output-selection blocks of Sect. 4.2 as shown in Fig. 2 , results in a UC construction of complexity size(U C) = 1.5k log 2 k + 2.5k log k + 9k + (u + 2k) log u + (k + 3v) log v −2u − 4v + 1; depth(U C) = k log k + 2k + v + 7 log k + 2 log u + 3 log v − 14.
Improved selection block constructions
In this section, we present efficient selection block S u v constructions. They can be plugged directly in our UC construction. The size and depth computation of UC presented in Sect. 3.1, uses efficient constructions of this section.
We start the presentation with two useful generalizations of the permutation blocks of Waksman [16] . Based on these, we construct efficient selection blocks which are directly used in our UC construction.
Generalized permutation blocks
P u u permutation block. A permutation block P u u is a programmable block that can be programmed to output any permutation of the inputs. Formally, given a permutation (π i ) u i=1 , π i ∈ {1, . . . , u}, ∀i = j : π i = π j that selects for the i-th output a unique input π i , P u u computes P (in 1 , .., in u ) = (in π1 , .., in πu ). When u is a power of 2, Waksman [16] describes an efficient recursive P u u construction built from X switching blocks. His P u u has size(P u u ) = 2u log u − 2u + 2 and depth(P u u ) = 2 log u − 1. Waksman also gives an efficient recursive algorithm to program the X switching blocks of his construction. (Fig. 4 describes a slight generalization of Waksman's construction; fixing u = v in Fig. 4 corresponds to Waksman's P u u .) The programming algorithm takes a u × u permutation matrix for the permutation (π i ) as input. It splits this u × u permutation matrix into two u/2 × u/2 permutation matrices that are recursively implemented by the left and the right P u/2 u/2 permutation sub-block and programs the X switching blocks correspondingly. Using a sparse matrix representation for the permutation matrices this algorithm can be efficiently implemented in O(u log u).
We note that Waksman's construction can be naturally generalized to the cases where u = v, i.e. the number of inputs and outputs differ. Below we define the resulting objects (which we call "truncated permutation" and "expanded permutation" blocks), and present their efficient constructions. 
, µ i ∈ {1, . . . , u}, ∀j = i : µ i = µ j selects the µ i -th input as the i-ths output. The truncated permutation block computes T P (in 1 , . . . , in u ) = (in µ1 , . . . , in µv ). block is programmed using a natural generalization of Waksman's recursive programming algorithm. The intended output mapping (µ i ) is expressed as a u × v truncated permutation matrix. In each recursion step the algorithm splits the u×v matrix into two u/2×v/2 truncated permutation matrices implemented by the left and right sub-block and programs the X switching blocks accordingly. In the end of the recursion, if the truncated permutation matrix is a u × 1 matrix with a one in the i-th row, the S u 1 selection block is programmed to select the i-th input value as output: σ 1 = i. This algorithm can be implemented in O((u + v) log v) using sparse matrix representations.
The complexity of this construction is size(T P u≥v v ) = (u+v) log v +u−3v +2 and depth(T P u≥v v ) = log u + log v − 1. EP u v≥u expanded permutation block. An EP u v≥u expanded permutation block permutes the u inputs to a subset of u of the v ≥ u outputs. The remaining v − u outputs are allowed to obtain any input value (they are intended to be later discarded and are called dummy outputs). Formally, an input mapping
, µ i ∈ {1, . . . , v}, ∀j = i : µ i = µ j specifies that the i-th input should be mapped to the µ i -th distinct output. The expanded permutation block computes EP (in 1 , . . . , in u ) = (out 1 , . . . , out v ) where (out s = in r ) ↔ (µ r = s), s ∈ {1, . . . , v}, r ∈ {1, . . . , u}.
The construction of the EP u v≥u is analogous to the previously described T P u≥v v block. At the base of the recursion, if u = 1, the single input in 1 is connected to each of the v outputs.
The programming algorithm of EP u v≥u is analogous to that of T P u≥v v as well. The input is a u × v matrix that corresponds to (µ i ) and it can be implemented in O ((u + v) log u) .
The construction has complexity size(EP u v≥u ) = (u + v) log u − 2u + 2 and depth(EP u v≥u ) = 2 log u.
Efficient selection blocks
We use truncated and expanded permutation blocks of the previous section to build efficient selection blocks S We use the network of Y blocks to duplicate (or omit) inputs as required by the selection block specification. The upper permutation block P u u can be programmed to deliver the desired input in i to any Y -layer input x j not already used by another input. For example, if input in i needs to be duplicated c i times, this can be achieved by programming the permutation to map in i to x j , and have blocks Y j through Y j+ci−1 to output x j . This way, as required, the value in i would be duplicated c i times.
For efficiency reasons, the wiring of the Y -layer is limited. In particular, input x i is delivered only to blocks Y i and Y 2u−i+1 , which are in column i. From there, x i can be propagated "to the right" from Y i (i.e. to blocks Y i+1 , ..., in the lower row) and/or "to the left" from Y 2u−i+1 (i.e. to blocks Y 2u−i+2 , ..., in the upper row). Note, blocks Y i and Y 2u−i+1 cannot receive different inputs from P u u . They, however, can produce different outputs, since one or both of them could be propagating the value of their neighbouring Y block.
It is not immediately clear that the inputs in 1 ...in u can be permuted such that the Y -layer can provide the right number of duplicates for each input. We show, that this in fact can be done. We observe that this permutation and the Y -layer programming can be reduced to the following box-packing problem. This implies that the next Step 3(a)ii doesn't cause a collision when putting the box of length s 4 ≥ s 3 into the lower row. After Step 3(a) ii, the number of occupied slots in the lower row is ω down = ω down + s 4 . In the end of the current iteration of Step 3, the number of occupied slots in the upper row is again less or equal to the number of occupied slots in the lower row: ω down − ω up = (ω down + s 4 ) − (ω up + s 3 ) = (ω down − ω up ) + (s 4 − s 3 ) ≥ 0 and hence the length relationship between the upper and lower rows (0 ≤ ω down − ω up ≤ s 4 − 2) is the invariant of Step 3. Therefore, no iteration of Step 3 causes a collision. As no step causes a collision, Algorithm 1 produces a valid arrangement.
C) Algorithm 1 is efficient. Sorting of the u boxes in Step 1 costs O(u log u). Steps 2 and 3 have a runtime of O(u), as in every iteration at least one box is eliminated. Hence the runtime of Algorithm 1 is in O(u log u).
Optimization of the universal circuit construction
As the order of the two inputs of a gate simulation block G can be swapped by swapping its function table, we can omit the last row of X blocks in the lower P k k permutation block of the S k/2 k selection block in the construction of U k (see Fig. 3(a), Fig. 6 and Fig. 4 ) and adapt the programming correspondingly. This results in a reduction of ∆size(U k ) = k log k − 2k + 2 and ∆depth(U k ) = k − 1.
Comparison and conclusion
We now compare our UC solution to the best previously known Valiant's UC [15] . Recall, we consider circuits UC u,v,k , universal for circuits of k gates, u inputs and v outputs. Valiant's UC has size(UC V aliant u,v,k ) = (19k+9.5u+9.5v) log k+O(k) and ours has size(UC u,v,k ) = 1.5k log 2 k + 2.5k log k + (u + 2k) log u + (k + 3v) log v + O(k). To help visualize the relationship, Table 1 . We also note the break-even point k eq = k| size rel =1 -the maximum size of circuits for which our UC is smaller. While Valiant's construction is asymptotically better, our UC is up to 50% smaller for small circuits, due to much lower constant factors. For PF-SFE, small circuits are of most interest, since only they can be evaluated efficiently today (indeed, UC for 5000-gate circuits has size ≈ 10 6 ). In addition, our construction is more detailed and seems to be much easier to implement than Valiant's. Thus, we believe that our UC construction is a good fit for practical PF-SFE. In support of our contribution, we have successfully implemented general PF-SFE based on the Fairplay system [10] and our UC construction. Acknowledgements. We thank reviewers of FC'08 for helpful comments.
